"IMF Conditionality" Talk at IR Department

Merih Angin (PhD, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) delivered a talk at our Department on 9 December, 2015. Her research examines the design of IMF programs for developing countries, focusing particularly on the variation in the number and scope of conditionality adopted by the organization. Her approach to the design of IMF programs relies on a new analytical framework, which she terms the “Two-Level Principal-Agent Model” of IMF lending. Focusing on the Turkish case, Merih Angın's talk offered evidence to suggest that economic bureaucracy both at the country and IMF level play a strong role in the design of conditionality in IMF programs. It was an insightful talk as her study enables us to explore a neglected topic by providing the variation concerning the impact of the relation between the Executive Board, the IMF staff and the recipient country.